I study the optimal design of marketable permit systems to regulate various pollutants (e.g. air pollution in urban areas) when the regulator lives in a real world of imperfect information and incomplete enforcement. I show that the regulator should have pollution markets integrated through optimal exchange rates when the marginal abatement cost curves in the di¤erent markets are steeper than the marginal bene…t curves; otherwise he should keep markets separated. I also …nd that incomplete enforcement reduces the advantage of market integration.
Introduction
In recent years, environmental policy makers are paying more attention to environmental markets as an alternative to the traditional command-and-control approach of setting to implement environmental markets to mitigate air pollution problems in urban areas across the country (Hahn, 1989; Foster and Hahn, 1995) . In addition, a few less developed countries are also beginning to experiment in di¤erent forms with emissions trading (World Bank, 1997; Montero, Sanchez, and Katz, forthcoming; Stavins, forthcoming).
The above experiences show that regulators always favor simple regulatory designs that can be implemented in practice over more optimal ones that generally involve nonlinear instruments and transfers to (or from) …rms. 1 Within this context of good policy design, 2 however, it is surprising the little attention that regulators and policy analysts have paid to multipollutant markets and the possibility of interpollutant trading in those cases where more than one pollutant is being controlled. Once markets have been set up, interpollutant trading requires de…ning some exchange rate through which emission permits from the di¤erent markets can be traded.
In the U.S. Acid Rain Program, which not only controls SO 2 but also NO x , there was some discussion about the possibility of trading SO 2 for NO x emissions and vice versa that never prospered. 3 The EPA's emissions trading policy implemented in Los Angeles, which controls …ve air pollutants, 4 does include a provision that, in principle, allows interpollutant trading; 5 but in practice, it has never been used. I do not have a complete explanation for this regulators' resistance to having pollution markets be more integrated.
Some regulators argue that because the environmental and economic consequences of interpollutant trading are rarely known with certainty (as in this paper), the appropriate exchange rate will be too di¢cult to estimate. Others argue that interpollutant trading could make their current enforcement e¤orts even less e¤ective by potentially shifting too 1 For a complete survey of optimal environmental regulation see Lewis (1996) . 2 I borrow the word "good" from Schmalensee (1989) to mean feasible to implement and, in our particular context, more e¢cient than command-and-control regulation. 3 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Public Law 101-594, title IV, § 403(c), Interpollutant trading. 4 The EPA's emissions trading policy covers all signi…cant stationary sources of pollution for …ve principal air pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC), nitrogen oxides (NO x ), particulate matter (PM) and SO 2 . much emissions from one pollutant to another. 6 We shall see below that neither concern should per se prevent the integration of pollutant markets but rather be part of the policy design. 7 Because in any urban air pollution control program, like in some other environmental problems, 8 the design and implementation of good environmental policy necessarily involves more than one pollutant (Eskeland, 1997) , the study of marketable permit systems to simultaneously regulate various pollutants becomes very relevant. 9 If the regulator has perfect information about costs and bene…ts of pollution control, it is not di¢cult to show that the regulator can implement the …rst-best through the allocation of marketable permits to the di¤erent markets without the need for interpollutant trading. In the real world, however, regulators must design and implement policies in the presence of signi…cant uncertainty concerning costs and bene…ts (Weitzman, 1974; Lewis, 1996) , and usually, under incomplete enforcement as well (Russell, 1990; Malik, 1990) . The objective of this article is to study the optimal design of multipollutant markets in such a context.
The optimal design speci…es permits allocations to each market and an exchange rate, if any, at which permits from two markets can be traded. Results indicate that the regulator should allow interpollutant trading and have markets fully integrated as long as the marginal cost curves are steeper than the marginal bene…t curves. This result is analogous to the result obtained by Weitzman (1974) , so a similar rationale applies here.
Interpollutant trading provides …rms with more compliance ‡exibility making the cost of control more certain, but at the same time, it makes the amount of control in each 6 Communication with Enrique Calfucura at Chile's National Comission for the Environment (October, 2000). 7 Even if enforcement levels in the markets to be integrated are di¤erent, the use of an appropriate exchange rate that controls for enforcement di¤erences could make interpollutant trading be a good policy option. 8 Global warming is another good example because current policy proposals include the control of various pollutants besides carbon. Yet another interesting example is George W. Bush's proposal to simultaneously implement cap-and-trade programs on electric utilities for NO x , SO 2 , mercury and CO 2 (Air Daily, Vol. 7, No. 189, October 3, 2000) . 9 In fact, this paper was motivated by the current interest of Chile's National Comission for the Environment in exploring quantity-based market instruments for simultaneously controlling various air pollutants in Santiago (mainly PM10 and NO x ). market more uncertain. Thus, when marginal cost curves are steeper than the marginal bene…t curves, the regulator should pay more attention to the cost of control rather than the amount of control, and therefore, have markets integrated.
The presence of incomplete enforcement reduces the advantage of market integration as the result of two opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, incomplete enforcement makes the amount of control relatively less uncertain when markets are integrated than when they are not, which increases the advantage of market integration. On the other hand, incomplete enforcement softens both quantity-based market designs, i.e., separated vs.
integrated markets, making them resemble non-linear instruments as in Roberts and Spence (1976) . When costs are higher than expected, …rms do not buy permits but choose not to comply and face an expected penalty fee. While both designs become more ‡exible in the presence of incomplete enforcement in the sense that the amount of control adapt to cost shocks, the "separated markets" design becomes relatively more ‡exible than the "integrated markets" instrument, because the latter already provided …rms with ‡exibility to diversify costs across markets. This ‡exibility e¤ect dominates the …rst e¤ect reducing the advantage of market integration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the model and explain …rms' compliance behavior for both market designs: separated and integrated markets. In Section 3, I introduce uncertainty and derive optimal market designs. In Section 4, I compare both designs and discuss the conditions under which one design provides higher expected welfare than the other. Concluding remarks and policy implications are o¤ered in Section 5. The regulator also knows that the bene…t curve from emissions reduction in market i in any given period is B i (q i ). As usual, I assume that
The Model
The regulator is also responsible for ensuring individual …rms' compliance whether markets are integrated or separated. As in Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Livernois and McKenna (1999) , …rms are required to monitor their own emissions and submit a compliance status report to the regulator. Emissions are not observed by the regulator except during costly inspection visits, when they can be measured accurately. Thus, some …rms may have an incentive to report themselves as being in compliance when, in reality, they are not. The compliance report also includes details of permit transfers, which are assumed to be tracked at no cost by the regulator. For example, if …rm A submits a report with one unit of pollution and a "false" permit transfer from …rm B, this can be easily identi…ed, since B would not report a transfer for which it does not get paid. To corroborate the truthfulness of reports received, however, the regulator must observe emissions, which is a costly process. 10 Note that because I am assuming that all parameters in the model (some of which are imperfectly known by the regulator) remain constant over time, the optimal market design will not require banking and borrowing of permits. 11 The aggregate cost curve is C(q) = R y c cdG, where y = G ¡1 (q). Note that C 0 (q) = y, C 0 (0) = c, and
. 12 Note that in the absence of interpollutant trading and full enforcement
The regulator lacks su¢cient resources to induce full compliance, 13 therefore, in order to verify reports' truthfulness, he randomly inspects those …rms reporting compliance through pollution reduction to monitor their emissions (or check their abatement equipment). Each …rm in market i that is reporting compliance faces a probability Á i of being inspected. Firms found to be in disagreement with their reports are levied a …ne F i and brought under compliance in the next period. 14 To come under compliance, …rms can either reduce pollution or buy permits. Firms reporting noncompliance face the same treatment, so it is always in a …rm's best economic interests to report compliance, even if that is not the case. 15 Finally, I assume that the regulator does not alter its policy of random inspections in response to information acquired about …rms' type, so each …rm submitting a compliance report faces a constant probability Á i of being inspected.
Before describing …rms' compliance behavior under incomplete enforcement, it is worth indicating here that to keep the model simple, I will later introduce the following assumptions:
Without much loss of generality, this symmetry will prevent us from relying on numerical solutions.
Compliance when markets are separated
When markets are designed to work separately, the regulator speci…es independently the number of permits to be auctioned o¤ (or freely distributed) in each market, i.e. x s 1 and x s 2 (superscript "s" refers to separated markets). Before studying optimal designs, let p s i be the auction clearing (or equilibrium) price in market i.
Each …rm seeks the compliance strategy that minimizes its expected discounted cost 13 Alternatively, we can simply say that the cost of inspection is large enough that full compliance is not socially optimal (Becker, 1968 ). 14 Regulator's enforcement power to bring a non-compliant …rm under compliance is discussed by Livernois and McKenna (1999) . To make sure that a non-compliant …rm found submitting a false report is in compliance during the next period (but not necesarily the period after), we can assume that the regulator always inspects the …rm during that next period, and in the case the …rm is found to be out of compliance again, the regulator raises the penalty to something much more severe. 15 Noncompliance and truth-telling could be a feasible strategy if …rms reporting noncompliance were subject to a …ne lower than F . See Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Livernois and McKenna (1999) for details.
of compliance. Depending on the value of Á i , F i , p s i (assume for the moment that Á i F i < p s i ), its marginal abatement cost c i , a …rm will follow one of two possible strategies: (i) compliance and submission of a truthful report (S CT ), and (ii) noncompliance and submission of a false report declaring compliance (S NF ). Compliance can be achieved by either reducing pollution or buying a permit. Because the horizon is in…nite, a …rm following a particular strategy at date t will …nd it optimal to follow the same strategy at date t + 1. The date subscript is therefore omitted in the calculations that follow. The subscript i is also omitted.
Consider …rst the case in which a …rm has relatively low control costs, that is, c < p s .
Such a low-cost …rm will never consider buying permits as part of its compliance strategy.
If S CT is its optimal strategy, it will comply by reducing pollution. Conversely, if S NF is its optimal strategy, should it be found submitting a false compliance report, it will return to compliance by reducing pollution instead of buying permits.
The expected discounted cost of adopting strategy S CT (compliance and truth-telling)
for a low-cost …rm is given by
where ± is the discount rate and superscript "l" signi…es a low-cost …rm. In this period, the …rm incurs a cost c from pollution reduction, and during the next period, the …rm incurs the present value of following S CT again. Solving (1) gives
The expected discounted cost of adopting strategy S NF (noncompliance and false reporting) for the same low-cost …rm (i.e., c < p s ) is given by
In this period, the …rm incurs no abatement costs. If the …rm is found to have submitted a false report, which happens with probability Á, the …rm must immediately pay the …ne F and return to compliance during the next period by reducing pollution at cost c (which is cheaper than buying permits at price p s ). After that, the …rm follows S NF again, with an expected cost of Z l NF . If the …rm is not inspected, which happens with probability 1 ¡ Á, the …rm incurs no cost during this period, and next period follows S NF again, with an expected cost of Z l NF . Solving (3) gives
A low-cost …rm is indi¤erent between following
. Letting e c be the marginal cost that makes Z l CT = Z l NF , we have that
is the "cut-o¤" point for a truthful compliance report when c < p s . Thus, if c · c · e c, the …rm follows S CT , whereas if e c < c < p s , the …rm follows S NF .
Consider now the case of a high-cost …rm, that is, a …rm for which c¸p s . Such a …rm will never consider reducing pollution as part of its compliance strategy. If S CT is its optimal strategy, it will comply by buying permits. Conversely, if S NF is its optimal strategy, when found submitting a false compliance report, it will return to compliance by buying permits instead of reducing pollution. As before, the expected discounted cost of adopting strategy S CT (compliance and truth-telling) for a high-cost …rm is given by
In this period, the …rm incurs a cost p s , and during the next period the …rm incurs the present value of following S CT again. Solving (6) gives
The expected discounted cost of adopting strategy S NF (noncompliance and false reporting) for a high-cost …rm is given by
In this period, the …rm incurs no abatement costs. If the …rm is found to have submitted a false report, which happens with probability Á, the …rm must immediately pay the …ne F and return to compliance next period by buying permits (which is cheaper than reducing pollution). After that, the …rm follows S NF again, with an expected cost of
If the …rm is not inspected, which happens with probability 1 ¡ Á, the …rm does not incur any cost in this period, and next period follows S NF again with an expected cost of Z h NF . Solving (8) gives
Because ÁF < p s by assumption, it is not di¢cult to show that Z h NF < Z h CT , so a high-cost …rm will always follow S NF .
Firms Because of partial compliance, the e¤ective amount of pollution reduction in any given period is expected to be
where the …rst term of the right-hand side represents reductions from low-cost compliant …rms and the second term represents reductions from a fraction°= Á=(1 + Á) of formerly non-compliant …rms that came into compliance this period by reducing one unit of pollution (subscript "e" refers to e¤ective amount). 16;17 Similarly, the e¤ective control costs incurred by …rms are expected to be
Note that as Á and/or F increases, e c approaches p s and C e (¢) approaches C(¢).
Because
16 To determine°, denote by K t the number of non-compliant …rms (i.e., those …rms that follow S NF ) that are in compliance at date t, and by N t the number of non-compliant …rms that are out of compliance at date t, and let K t + N t = 1. In other words, K t are non-compliant …rms that were inspected in t ¡ 1
and brought under compliance at date t. The value of K t can then be obtained
Note that in this multi-period model, at t ¡ 1 there are N t¡1 …rms facing a probability Á of being inspected. Using N t¡1 = 1 ¡ K t¡1 and setting K t = K t¡1 for steady state gives
Note that because Á · 1,°'s upper bound is 1/2 in this model. But as the enforcement power (regulator's ability to bring and keep non-compliant …rms under compliance) increases,°'s upper limit approaches 1. That would be the case in our model, if we assume, for example, that the regulator is able to keep the non-compliant …rm under compliance for more than one period. 18 To see that grandfathered permits and auctioned permits are equivalent, let us write the market clearing condition under grandfathered permits (each …rm receives x s permits for free)
On the left-hand side we have three types of sellers: compliant …rms, a fraction°of non-compliant …rms that came into compliance this period by reducing emission so they can now sell their permits in the market, and a fraction (1 ¡°) of non-compliant …rms that are not in compliance today. On the right-hand side we have the buyers of permits: non-compliant …rms that are in compliance this period by buying permits instead of reducing pollution. Developing the expression above yields (12) .
The left-hand side of (12) is the total number of permits supplied by the regulator, while the right-hand side is purchases from high-cost …rms (i.e., c > p s ) following S NF strategy that in this period come under compliance by buying permits instead of reducing pollution. Solving (12) gives
where G ¡1 (1 ¡ x=°) can be viewed as the marginal cost c just after 1 ¡ x s =°units of pollution have been reduced. 19 Since the equilibrium price of permits under full compli- 
Compliance when markets are integrated
When markets are designed to work together, the regulator speci…es simultaneously the number of permits to be auctioned o¤ in each market, x t 1 and x t 2 respectively, and the exchange rate ® at which permits from market 1 can be traded for permits from market 2 (superscript "t" refers to integrated markets). Note that because permits are fully tradeable across markets, it is irrelevant how the regulator allocated the total number of permits, x t 1 + ®x t 2 , between the two markets. In other words, the regulator just need to specify x t 12 = x t 1 + ®x t 2 and ®. Firms' compliance when markets work together is not much di¤erent from the previous analysis but for the market clearing conditions. If p t 1 and p t 2 are the clearing prices in markets 1 and 2, respectively, the "integrated markets" clearing condition is
19 Note that for a uniform distribution of g(c) = 1=C 00 = 1=(c ¡ c), we have
The left-hand side of (14) is the total number of permits from both markets expressed as permits of market 1. The …rst term of the right-hand is purchases from high-cost …rms in market 1 (i.e., c 1 > p t 1 ) following S NF strategy and the second term is purchases from high-cost …rms in market 2 (i.e., c 2 > p t 2 ) following the same strategy. When markets are fully integrated, a …rm in either market is indi¤erent between buying one permit in market 1 at price p t 1 than 1=® permits in market 2 at price p t 2 , so we have that
Thus, from (14) and (15) ; ®). Having understood …rms' compliance behavior under incomplete enforcement, we now turn to its e¤ects on optimal instrument design and on instrument choice when the regulator is uncertain about costs and bene…ts.
Markets design
In the real world, regulators must choose policy goals and instruments in the presence of signi…cant uncertainty concerning both B(q) and C(q). It is true, however, that while both the regulator and …rms are uncertain about the true shape of the bene…t curve, …rms generally know or have a better sense than the regulator of the true value of their costs.
So far I have not assumed any particular shape for the bene…t and cost curves. To keep the model tractable after the introduction of uncertainty, however, I follow Weitzman (1974) and Baumol and Oates (1988) in considering linear approximations for the marginal bene…t and cost curves and additive uncertainty. Then, let the expected bene…t and cost curves in market i in any given period be, respectively 
Recall that the realization of µ i is observed by all …rms in market i before they make and implement their compliance (and production) plans. Because µ i (and also´i) does not vary overtime, one can argue that the regulator may (imperfectly) deduce its value with a lag from the aggregate behavior of …rms. However, I assume that he adheres to the original regulatory design from the beginning of time. 21 
Designing separated markets
The regulator needs to specify the number of permits x s 1 and x s 2 to be allocated in each market, respectively, in any given period. He considers each market separately and solves
20 Note …rst that the linear marginal cost curve results simply from a uniform distribution for g i (c i ).
Further, the notation b i is meant to be consistent with c i in the cost curve. 21 Alternatively, we can say that new sources of uncertainty arise continually, so the issue of uncertainty is never resolved. For example, we can let µ and´follow (independent or correlated) random walks. The computation of compliance strategies would be the same, but the computation of the welfare function would di¤er a bit because the variance of µ and´would grow linearly with time. Furthermore, if µ and change from period to period, the optimal market design may also involve banking and borrowing of permits (Williams, 2001 ).
where q s e (x; µ) and C s e (x; µ) can be derived from (10) and (11) 
and where
Substituting (17)- (19) into (16), the …rst-order condition for x s reduces to
where
The …rst-order condition (20) indicates that at the optimum the expected marginal bene…t is equal to the expected equilibrium price of permits (i.e. expected marginal cost).
Furthermore, because of the linear approximations and additive uncertainty, the optimal amount of permits x s is independent of´and µ. Eq. (21), on the other hand, shows that under incomplete enforcement (°< 1) the e¤ective amount of reduction, q s e (x s ; µ), does depend on the value of µ. If costs are higher than expected (µ > 0), …rms will reduce their level of compliance, and consequently, the e¤ective amount of reduction. Under complete enforcement (°= 1), however, the amount of (e¤ective) reduction is …xed and equal to 1 ¡ x s , which is simply baseline emissions minus the number of auctioned permits.
Designing integrated markets
If both markets are designed to work together, the regulator needs specify the total number of permits x t 12 = x t 1 + ®x t 2 to be allocated and the exchange rate ® at which permits can be traded. Then, he considers both markets simultaneously and solves
where q t e i and C t ei can be obtained, respectively, from (17) and (18) by simply replacing p s by the corresponding price p t i . From (14) and (15) and assuming C 00 1 = C 00 2 = C 00 , these prices are
Even in this already simple model of two pollutants, the solution of (22) not correlated with´, the optimal design when markets are integrated is
Proof. See the appendix.
Because of the symmetry of the problem the results under Proposition 1 are very intuitive. 22 The …rst result indicates that the total number of permits is the same under either market design. The second result indicates the exchange rate at which permits from market 1 and 2 can be traded is exactly equal to the ratio of expected marginal damages in the optimal separated-markets design, which must also be equal to the ratio of expected prices. Since we do not impose restrictions on the values of b i and c i , the value of ® can be equal, greater or lower than 1. In fact if b 2 > b 1 and c 2 > c 1 , the optimal value of ® will be greater than 1.
Using the results of Proposition 1, we can now easily compare prices and quantities (i.e., amount of e¤ective reduction) under both market designs. Prices are given by
where p s i is given by (19) . While expected prices do not vary with market design (i.e. E[p Quantities, on the other hand, are given by
where q s ei is given by (21) . Again, while expected quantities do not vary with market design (i.e. E[q that will take place in each market become more uncertain (this leads to bene…t losses in expected terms). In deciding whether to have markets integrated and allow interpollutant trading, the regulator will inevitably face this trade-o¤ between cost savings and bene…t losses. We study this trade-o¤ more formally in the next section.
Integrated vs separated markets
To …nd the optimal policy design, we start by writing the di¤erence in expected welfare between the two market designs (integrated and separated markets) (29) is that if ¢ ts > 0, the optimal policy design is to have both markets integrated.
To explore under which conditions this is the case, we conveniently rewrite (29) as
The …rst curly bracket of the right hand side of (30) is the di¤erence in environmental bene…ts provided by the two market designs, whereas the second curly bracket is the di¤erence in abatement costs. Introducing the same simplifying assumptions under Proposition 1, (30) becomes
where p 
where the …rst term of the right hand side is the di¤erence in expected bene…ts and the second term is the di¤erence in expected costs. Finally, rearranging (32) leads to
where°= Á=(1 + Á) < 1 is the fraction of non-compliant …rms that are in compliance today, E[µ 2 ] is the variance of the cost shocks in either market, B 00 < 0 is the slope of the marginal bene…t curves and C 00 > 0 is the slope of the marginal cost curves. We summarize the above result in the following proposition not correlated with´, the optimal policy design under full enforcement (°= 1) is to have both markets integrated as long as C 00 > jB 00 j. Under incomplete enforcement, however, the optimal design is to have markets integrated only if C 00 > (2 ¡°) jB 00 j.
The …rst result stated in Proposition 2 is that under full enforcement (°= 1) the regulator should allow interpollutant trading as long as the marginal cost curves are steeper than the marginal bene…t curves. This result is analogous to the result obtained by Weitzman (1974) when he compared price (e.g., taxes) and quantity (e.g., tradeable permits) instruments. Weitzman found that if the marginal cost curve was steeper than the marginal bene…t curve the regulator should pay more attention to the cost of control than the amount of control (i.e., emission reduction), and therefore, he should use the price instrument.
The exact same rationale applies to our multipollutant markets story. Interpollutant trading provides more ‡exibility to …rms in case costs are higher than expected, but at by de…nition) because both market designs adapt to some extent to cost shocks. Because°( 2 ¡°) >°, the second e¤ect dominates, so the overall advantage of market integration is reduced. In addition, note that as enforcement weakens (°falls), the welfare di¤erence between the two market designs shrinks and disappears when there is no compliance at all (i.e.,°= 0). 
Conclusions and policy implications
Because in many environmental problems the design and implementation of good policy necessarily involves more than one pollutant, I have developed a simple model to study the optimal design of environmental markets (i.e. tradeable emission permits) to simultaneously regulate various pollutants when the regulator lives in a real world of imperfect information and incomplete enforcement. I found that if the marginal abatement cost curves are relatively steeper than the marginal bene…t curves, which seems to be the case for some urban air pollutants (Cifuentes, 2001 ), the regulator should have multipollutant markets integrated through optimal exchange rates, unless enforcement is too weak, in which case, the regulator should keep markets separated.
The results of the paper are also relevant for a regulator that is implementing a multipollutant o¤set system where new …rms must compensate for all their emissions by buying emission reduction credits from existing …rms. each market is not necessarily at its (ex-ante) optimum, the exchange rate may depart from our recommendations in Section 3.
I hope that the results of this paper provide the basis for empirical and applied work on the design of multipollutant markets in more real settings. In such cases, the model should consider, among other things, atmospheric interaction among pollutants, spatial and temporal characteristics of the pollutants, joint production of pollutants, monitoring heterogeneity and, possibly, institutional constraints. If we also let cost and bene…t curves vary overtime (e.g., µ and´following random walks), the model should also consider for the possibility of banking and borrowing of permits. We leave an application of this model to the case of air pollution in Santiago-Chile for further research.
